In 2012, JPMorgan accumulated a USD 6.2 billion loss on a credit derivatives portfolio, the so-called "London Whale", partly as a consequence of de-correlations of non-perfectly correlated positions that were supposed to hedge each other. Motivated by this case, we devise a factor model for correlations that allows for scenario-based stress-testing of correlations. We derive a number of analytical results related to a portfolio of homogeneous assets. Using the concept of Mahalanobis distance, we show how to identify adverse scenarios of correlation risk. As an example, we apply the factor-model approach to the "London Whale" portfolio and determine the value-at-risk impact from correlation changes. Since our findings are particularly relevant for large portfolios, where even small correlation changes can have a large impact, a further application would be to stress-test portfolios of central counterparties, which are of systemically relevant size.
Introduction
Diversification -typically captured by correlation -lies at the heart of many financial applications: a diversified portfolio is less risky than a concentrated portfolio; hedging strategies may involve only imperfectly correlated assets instead of perfect substitutes. It is well-known that correlations are not constant over time and may be strongly affected by specific events (Karolyi and Stulz, 1996; Longin and Solnik, 2001; Ang and Bekaert, 2002; Wied et al., 2012; Pu and Zhao, 2012; Adams et al., 2017) which in turn may lead to potentially unexpected or unquantified losses (e.g. LTCM Jorion (2000) , Amaranth Advisors Chincarini (2007) ). This * Part of this research was undertaken while Fabian Woebbeking was visiting Columbia University, NYC. This work is financially supported by the Global Association of Risk Professionals (GARP), by the Europlace Institute of Finance (EIF) -Labex Louis Bachelier and by The Frankfurt Institute of Risk Management and Regulation (FIRM). The authors would like to thank Stephen Taylor (NJIT) for helpful comments and discussion.
† Berlin School of Economics and Law, packham@hwr-berlin.de ‡ Goethe University Frankfurt, woebbeking@finance.uni-frankfurt.de paper develops a technique for generating correlation matrices from specific risk factor scenarios. The method allows to challenge diversification benefits in a realistic way by quantifying potential losses from correlation changes or a correlation break-down due to various scenarios.
Consequently, worst-case scenarios and their impact can be identified. Quantifying these risks is particularly important if a portfolio or a hedging strategy may be adversely affected by a correlation breakdown amongst the portfolio constituents. For example, hedging strategies involving non-perfect substitutes, such as a stock portfolio and index futures for hedging, are sensitive to correlation changes and thus vulnerable to adverse correlation scenarios.
The technique borrows elements from parameterising correlation matrices in interest rate modelling, e.g. Rebonato (2002) ; Brigo (2002) ; Schoenmakers and Coffey (2000) . These parameterisations have in common that the degree of correlation depends on the difference in maturity of the underlying interest rates (e.g. swap rates). In its simplest form, correlations are determined by e −β|i−j| , where β > 0 is a constant parameter, and i, j are maturities. This captures the stylised fact that correlations decay with increasing maturity difference.
In this paper, this approach is generalised by defining factors that characterise differences in the assets under consideration, and by parameterising correlations via "distances" capturing these differences. The parameters themselves can be calibrated for example from historical data.
Scenarios are generated by varying the parameters, where an increase in a parameter captures a de-correlation related to a factor.
The method is capable of identifying the factor structure of worst case scenarios. More specifically, given the mapping of correlation risk factor to risk measure, one can find the global maximum of the risk measure and infer the corresponding risk factor scenario. As each parameter represents an economically relevant correlation risk factor, it is therefore possible to identify critical portfolio structures that might require particular attention from a risk management perspective.
Aside from the impact of a given scenario, one is also interested in the plausibility of the chosen scenarios. This can be implemented by assigning a joint probability distribution to the correlation parameters in order to define a constraint for correlation scenarios. In this paper, the constraint is specified via the so-called Mahalanobis distance, which measures the distance of a normally distributed random vector from the center of the distribution.
To demonstrate the technique, correlation stress tests are applied to the portfolio of the so-called "London Whale", a term used in the finance industry to denote a USD 6.2 billion loss in 2012 of a credit derivative portfolio run by JPMorgan. In late 2011, in an effort to reduce the risk of the position without monetising losses, the notional amount of the portfolio was increased, while relying on the ability of similar credit index positions to act as hedges for each other (JPMorgan, 2013; United-States-Senate, 2013b ). Our analysis shows that correlation scenarios and stress tests reveal the high riskiness of this position and thus might have led to a more appropriate risk assessment of the position. 1
A further application where correlation scenario and stress testing can reveal inherent risks is the practice of so-called "portfolio margining" in initial margin calculations of clearing houses.
Here, netting of offsetting positions reduces the margin requirement. However, when positions are not perfect hedges, but only highly correlated, then an adverse correlation scenario could lead to substantial margin calls, thereby increasing counterparty risk at a systematic level.
The literature on establishing correlation stress testing is scarce, even though it is well established that correlations are not constant over time and may be strongly affected by specific events (Longin and Solnik, 2001; Wied et al., 2012; Pu and Zhao, 2012) . Adams et al. (2017) observe that correlations vary over time and, in addition, experience level shifts and structural breaks that occur in response to economic or financial shocks. Krishnan et al. (2009) and Mueller et al. (2017) provide empirical evidence that investors demand a correlation risk premium, which is related to the uncertainty about future correlation changes. Buraschi et al.
(2010) develop a framework for inter-temporal portfolio choice that includes hedging components against correlation risk.
The prominent role of correlation in financial portfolios led to regulatory agencies calling for risk model stress-tests that account for "significant shifts in correlations" (BCBS, 2006, p. 207 ff.) . However, the literature on correlation modelling and correlation stress-testing is scarce: aside from challenges of mathematical consistency in correlation modelling (correlation matrices must be positive semi-definite, see e.g. Qi and Sun (2010) ; Ng et al. (2014) for solutions to this problem), the specification of stressful yet plausible scenarios for correlations is far from straightforward.
The selection of plausible scenarios poses a challenge in the development of stress-testing methods in general. The use of historical or hypothetical scenarios is problematic, as the probability and thus, the importance of a scenario is typically unknown, while at the same time relevant scenarios might be neglected. In an extensive study, Alexander and Sheedy (2008) compare various well-known models in their ability to conduct meaningful stress tests. Glasserman et al. (2015) develop an empirical likelihood approach for the selection of stress scenarios, with a focus on reverse stress-testing. Kopeliovich et al. (2015) present a reverse stress testing method to determine scenarios that lead to a specified loss level. Breuer and Csiszár (2013) and Flood and Korenko (2015) use the Mahalanobis distances to select scenarios from a multivariate distribution of risk factors. However, to the best of our knowledge, no such methods have been developed specifically for correlation stress testing.
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we present the correlation stress testing methodology alongside analytical results for both, the stress-test and scenario selection procedures. Section 3 consists of a concise review of the "London Whale" case as well as the results from correlation stress-testing the credit portfolio using the methods developed in the previous section. Section 4 concludes. A detailed review of the London Whale case is provided as an online appendix at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3210536.
2 Correlation parameterisation and stress-testing
Factor model
The principal idea behind the correlation parameterisation developed in this paper is to split portfolio correlations into dependence contributions associated with several risk factors. With each risk factor a parameter determining the degree of de-correlation on the overall correlation is associated. Calibrating these parameters and then adjusting them allows to translate specific economic scenarios into changes on correlations.
More precisely, let C be an n × n-correlation matrix (i.e., positive semi-definite, symmetric, with entries in [−1, 1], and ones on the diagonal) related to the returns of n financial instruments.
In the context of the London Whale position analysed later, the entries of C are the correlations of credit index spread returns and related tranche spread returns. 2 In the London Whale case these are typically positive (with only few exceptions near zero, which are set to a small positive constant), and generally we assume that all correlations are in (0, 1].
The factors that determine the correlations are denoted by x = (x 1 , . . . , x m ) . In the context of the London Whale position, the factors include the maturity, the index series, a dummy variable determining whether the security is investment grade or not, and others. Further choices could be factors relating to geographical regions, industries or balance sheet data. Correlations c ij of securities i and j are modelled as
with β 1 , . . . , β m positive coefficients, the parameters. Similar approaches to parameterising correlation matrices are common in interest-rate modelling, see e.g. Schoenmakers and Coffey (2000) ; Rebonato (2004) ; Brigo and Mercurio (2006) . Essentially, this functional form implies that the greater the distance |x k i − x k j |, the greater the de-correlation amongst the securities i and j. If two instruments are identical in all respects, then they are assigned a correlation of 1.
Given historical returns, the parameters β 1 , . . . , β m are easily determined by standard regression techniques such as OLS on the transformed correlations − ln(c ij ). A scenario such as "the correlation between investment grade and high-yield securities decreases" is then implemented by increasing the corresponding β-parameter. With parameters calibrated on a regular basis, the parameter history can be used to obtain reasonable scenarios.
Stress-testing a homogeneous portfolio
To better understand the stress testing effect we consider a stylised, homogeneous portfolio and derive closed formulas for the impact of various correlation stress-test scenarios. More specifically, the setup is as follows: the m risk factors are binary in the sense that they express properties that are either present or absent in a security. The number of securities is n = 2 m and they exhibit all 2 m combinations of risk factor combinations (for example, one could set 2 In this setting correlations are not implied tranche correlations, which are used for pricing, but historical spread return correlations, as would be used in risk management.
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, with (i − 1) ⊕ (j − 1) the bitwise XOR operator of the binary representations of i − 1 and j − 1). As a consequence, no two securities are equal in terms of their risk factor exposure. The securities all have equal volatility, and the portfolio is equally-weighted. However, as a consequence of choosing binary risk factor combinations, the correlations are not homogeneous.
Throughout we assume that risk of the portfolio is measured by value-at-risk (VaR) in a variance-covariance approach, i.e.,
where N 1−α denotes the (1 − α)-quantile of the standard normal distribution, V 0 denotes the current position value, w is the vector of portfolio weights and Σ denotes the covariance matrix of the portfolio components' returns. In this setting we assume that the expected return is zero, which is a reasonable assumption for short time horizons.
Proposition 1. The portfolio variance is given by
The average correlation amongst pairwise different asset returns is
Proof. Assuming without loss of generality that the bitwise XOR operator described above defines the value of the indicator variables, the portfolio variance simplifies to
Iterating this calculation m = log 2 n times gives
The average correlation is given as
and the claim follows from the first part of the Proposition.
Corollary 2. The sensitivity of the variance with respect to a single β-factor β l is ∂w Σw
If the β-factors are homogeneous, i.e., β 1 = · · · = β m = β, then the overall sensitivity is
For stress-testing we associate a probability distribution with β. This allows to formulate scenarios in probabilistic terms and determine their impact. We assume that the risk factors themselves are homogeneous, i.e., β k = β, for alle k = 1, . . . , m, and that changes in the risk factor coefficients, ∆β, are jointly normally distributed, each one with mean 0 and variance σ 2 β and with correlations ρ β .
Following e.g. Kupiec (1998) , we define a stress scenario on one set of ("core") risk factors and, assuming that the given covariance matrix is unaltered by the stress scenario, set the remaining ("peripheral") risk factors to their optimal estimates conditional on the scenario.
Let β s denote the j < m core factor parameters that are stressed directly. The remaining m − j peripheral risk factor parameters β u are affected by the stress scenario only indirectly. Under the normal distribution setting above, it holds that the optimal estimator of ∆β u conditional on ∆β s is (e.g. Theorem §13.2 of Shiryaev, 1996) :
where Σ us and Σ ss denote the covariance and variance matrices of β u and β s .
Proposition 3. The portfolio variance when j of the β-risk factors coefficients are stressed by ∆β is given by
Proof. It is easily verified that the entries of the (m − j) × j-matrix Σ us Σ −1 ss are
To illustrate the impact of a correlation stress, we apply the above results to a portfolio of n = 2 m assets, where each asset has an annualised volatility of σ = 0.25 and the average . All graphs show a 99% Value-at-Risk, and the initial and unstressed β is calibrated to an average asset correlation of ρ ≈ 0.3, unless indicated otherwise (cf. Equation (3)).
asset correlation in the portfolio is 0.3 unless specified differently. The risk factor coefficient β is calibrated to reflect the target asset correlation for the number of factors m, e.g. with m = 5 this is achieved by β = 0.5204 (cf. Equation (3)). The steepness or sensitivity of VaR to changes in β is determined by the initial average asset correlation, the correlation between risk factors, as well as the number of factors j ≤ m that are initially stressed (see bottom graphs in Figure 1 ). In other words, an initially high average asset correlation reduces the risk of changing correlations, because the portfolio is already poorly diversified. The VaR impact of stressing only j < m factors decreases with ρ β , which captures the dependence between correlation risk factors.
Stress-test scenario selection

Mahalanobis distance
When stress-testing, aside from understanding the impact of given scenarios, one is also interested in the converse question: What is the worst scenario amongst all scenarios that occur within some pre-given range? One way to specify the range is via the so-called Mahalabonis distance, which measures the distance of a realisation of a normally distributed random vector from its mean.
Recall that correlations c i,j are modelled as
with positive parameters β 1 , . . . , β m . If β = (β 1 , . . . , β m ) is a random vector with E(β) = β and covariance matrix Σ β , then the Mahalabonis distance is defined as
We are interested in identifying the worst-case scenario β * that maximises VaR subject to a constraint on the Mahalabonis distance:
where VaR α is given by Equation (1) with correlation matrix imposed by β. If the parameter h in the constraint is chosen as the α * -quantile of the χ 2 (m)-distribution, then β expresses the worst correlation scenario amongst all scenarios that lie on the inner ellipsoids covering a probability of α * . From Equation (1) it is obvious that maximising Var α does not depend on α and is equivalent to maximising the variance. A trivial consequence is that β * also maximises expected shortfall. Writing the diagonal matrix with the standard deviations as the entries on
The Lagrangian is
with q ij the entries of Σ −1
β . The first-order conditions are
Assuming that all factors are indicators measuring if a property is present in both securities or not, i.e.,
Assuming throughout that the factors are chosen in such a way that at least for one pair of securities the respective indicator is 1 implies that c l,1 = 0, for all l = 1, . . . , k.
Proposition 4. The solutions to (6) satisfy
where W (z) is the Lambert W -function (also called product logarithm), which gives the solution for w in z = w e w , z ∈ C.
Proof. For ease of notation, we omit the index l, so we show that c 1 e −β + c 2 + c 3 β = 0, with
which can be re-arranged to 1 w e −w c 1 e c 2 /c 3 + c 3 = 0.
Using that 1 w e −w = − c 3 c 1 e c 2 /c 3 yields the claim.
Homogeneous portfolio analysis
To better understand the stress testing effect we consider a stylised, homogeneous portfolio as in Section 2.2 and determine the worst stress scenario that lies within a Mahalabonis distance comprising 95% of the total scenarios. As before, the m risk factors are binary and the number of securities is n = 2 m comprising all 2 m risk factor combinations. The securities all have equal volatility, and the portfolio is equally-weighted. The risk factor coefficients β are also assumed to be homogeneous, i.e., they have identical means β, variances σ 2 β and correlations ρ β .
Proposition 5. In the homogeneous setting, the risk factor coefficients of the worst scenario within a given Mahalabonis distance h are constant, i.e., β * 1 = · · · = β * m = β * , and given by
Proof. Because of the binary risk factors, the first-order conditions (4) simplify to
where q lk are the entries of Σ −1 β and, because of the homogeneity of β, q 11 = · · · = q mm and q lk constant for all l = k. It is easily verified that
For fixed l, the number of instances where 1 {x l i =x l j } = 1, i, j = 1, . . . , n, is n 2 /2; in particular, this number is constant regardless of the choice of l. Whenever 1 {x l i =x l j } = 1, then, across all i, j, the number of terms where 1 {x k i =x k j } = 1 holds is equally distributed: the 2 m−1 terms, when k = l, are the result of all combinations of m − 1 zeros and ones. As a consequence, the sums in the first-order conditions have the same number of terms and would differ only in β 1 , . . . , β m ; however, because they all have the same structure it follows that β * 1 = · · · = β * m = β * . Hence, the first-order conditions reduce to one condition, which is given by
Because all β's are equal, the worst stress scenario at a given Mahalabonis distance h is one of the two solutions of the quadratic equation
Solving for β gives
The claim follows because the portfolio variance is monotone decreasing in β.
Obviously, ceteris paribus, the portfolio risk and VaR of the worst-case scenario increase with the risk factor variance σ 2 β and the risk factor correlation ρ β . They decrease with increasing number of risk factors, m. However, we will see in the examples below that if the initial β is fitted from a given constant asset correlation matrix, then the worst-case scenario may increase with the number of risk factors as well.
In this setting, we consider a portfolio where the asset returns have an average correlation of 0.3. With five β risk factor coefficients, this is achieved by β = 0.5204 (cf. Equation (3)).
We set ρ β = 0.1972 and σ β = 0.1428 (these values correspond to the historical averages from the "London Whale" case described below). The 95% worst-case scenario is β = 0.2361. With a notional of 100 and an annualised asset volatility of 0.25, the initial one-day 99%-VaR of 2.09% increases by 33% to 2.79%. Figure 2 To understand JPMorgan's strategy, trading and risk management of the loss generating credit portfolio, we consolidate publicly available information on the London Whale.
This section presents our findings in a very concise format, the detailed review is available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3210536.
JPMorgan, in its function as a lender, is naturally exposed to credit risk. In mid-2011, JPM's Chief Investment Office decided to establish a short credit position via its synthetic credit portfolio (SCP), a portfolio of credit index derivatives. 4 The initial purpose of the portfolio was to act as a macro hedge that would offset naturally long credit exposure (JPMorgan, 2013, p. 26) . A similar strategy and portfolio was already successfully employed during the 2008-2009 credit crisis. The decision to re-establish the portfolio was possibly influenced by the deteriorating credit environment in Europe at that time.
The portfolio was based on the two major global credit derivative index families, the CDX for the United States and the iTraxx for Europe. 5 In addition to the indices, each comprising a portfolio of 125 single-name credit default swaps (CDS), there exists a market of tranche 4 A short position in credit risk corresponds to buying CDS protection, i.e., the protection buyer receives default insurance in return for a fixed premium. Thus, a deteriorating credit quality benefits the protection buyer as a payout becomes more likely and hence, the position can be called a short credit risk position.
5 The CDX and iTraxx index families are owned, managed, compiled and published by Markit Group Limited. A new trading strategy aimed at reducing RWA by increasing positions with opposite market sensitivity. In order to comply with stress limits, the strategy was implemented by forward spread trades, as was stated later during an interview with JPMorgan's internal task force (United-States-Senate, 2013b, p. 52). In the context of the SCP, forward spread trades meant buying protection on short maturity indices, while selling protection on longer maturities. This would hedge in the near term but generate credit exposure on the long term.
By the end of January 2012, after experiencing a loss of 50 million from the default of Kodak, the traders where faced with three objectives: stemming the year-to-date (YTD) losses on the SCP, reducing RWA and maintaining protection to prevent default losses ("Kodak moments").
All objectives were addressed simultaneously by adding more positions to the portfolio, namely, long risk positions to participate in the upward moving market, while generating carry to fund the YTD losses and short risk positions. Additionally, protection was bought to create positive P&L from Kodak type events. Therefore, the traders increased the size of both their long and short positions.
On March 23, 2012, the CIO's most senior executive ordered the traders to "put the phones down", i.e., to seize all related trading activities (United-States-Senate, 2013a, Exhibit 1i). At this point, the SCP had a net notional of about USD 157 billion (United-States-Senate, 2013a, Exhibit 1a), which was 260% up from the September 2011 net notional (and slightly more than Table 1 . Ceasing to trade meant, of course, that the traders could no longer influence P&L, and as a consequence the losses on the SCP sky-rocketed.
Publicly available sources, such as JPMorgan's internal task force (2013) and the UnitedStates-Senate (2013b), focus on management and organizational problems, position misreport- ing, market manipulation, and spreadsheet-errors. This neglects that the classical risk measures employed might have been insufficient in their own right. To monitor the SCP, JPMorgan (2013) primarily used the Value-at-Risk that would be reported in its 10-K filings. Cont and Wagalath (2015) find that this risk measure was insufficient due to the size of the SCP, as it scales linearly with position size and neglects market impact. In addition, the authors state that a correlation decay, which was observable before the collapse of the portfolio, was likely caused by the SCP's own market impact.
Aside from VaR, credit spread widening of 10% (CSW-10) is the second pivotal risk measure, a sensitivity measure for the profit and loss impact of a simultaneous 10% increase in credit spreads. JPMorgan's traders relied heavily on this measure to balance their portfolio in a way that offsetting positions would minimize the overall CSW-10 (JPMorgan, 2013).
However, a hedging strategy primarily based on a sensitivity measure, CSW-10 in this case, ignores that correlation amongst the portfolio components may be imperfect. Value-at-risk takes into account correlations, but to the best of our knowledge, potential changes in correlation were ignored. As the SCP was a portfolio composed of a large number of offsetting positions that are highly, but not perfectly dependent, correlation is easily seen to be a, if not the, crucial portfolio was exposed to more erratic changes that would be captured only by stress-tests.
3.2 Correlation stress-testing the "London Whale"
Correlation methodology
In the following, the sensitivity to various correlation scenarios of the SCP position is calculated from historical data. The analysis is based on the portfolio composition of 23 March 2012, the day when trading ceased. The historical data are provided by Markit and consist of daily CDX and itraxx spreads and tranche data (spreads, upfront payments and base correlations) of the series in place. Details on how the tranche data was transformed to credit spreads are given in B.
As the main risk factors affecting correlation the following five properties are identified: maturity, index series, investment grade (yes/no), CDX vs. itraxx, index vs. tranche. Information about seniority of tranches was considered, but failed to provide useful results. Hence, the correlation c ij of credit spread returns of credit derivatives indexed by i and j is given by:
In the results provided below, all distance measures are normalised to [0, 1], which makes the impact of the calibrated parameters comparable. de-correlated over time, while the correlation differences driven by the region (CDX vs. itraxx) decreased. Especially in Q4 2011 and Q1 2012, when strategic decisions regarding the SCP were made, these were major drivers of correlation changes.
CDS portfolio risk
The risk of a CDS portfolio is expressed by value-at-risk (VaR) using the variance-covariance approach, i.e., the portfolio change is approximated by a first-order Taylor approximation in the credit spreads, and credit spread returns are assumed to be normally distributed. The portfolio risk is then fully captured by the portfolio variance. To simplify notation, we omit the maturity of a CDS contract and use the following notation related to CDS position i in a portfolio of n CDS positions: s i,t denotes the fair spread at time t, A i is the notional amount of the position and RPV01 i,t is the risky PV01 at time t. Details, such as the calculation of RPV01 i,t , are given in A.
The portfolio value is then expressed as
where
A i is positive for a short protection position and A i is negative for a long protection position.
The portfolio P&L ∆V is approximated by spread returns in the following way:
denotes the percentage weight of the position in the portfolio and r i = ∆s i s i,t−1 denotes the spread return. For ease of notation, we write V t−1 for the linear approximation of the portfolio value. Now, assuming that r = (r 1 , . . . , r n ) ∼ N(0, Σ), i.e., spread returns are jointly normally distributed with expectation 0 (a reasonable assumption for small time horizons) and covariances described by the n × n matrix Σ, the portfolio VaR is again given by the variance-covariance approach, see Equation (1).
Results
On March 23, 2012 JPMorgan's senior management ordered to seize all trading activities for the SCP. The exact portfolio composition is known only for this day from publicly available sources.
To calculate risk figures for the SCP, the relevant credit index data is taken from Markit and converted as necessary via the credit valuation model in A.
The approach uses historical data to fit parameters for both the P&L distribution and the correlation model. After processing the data and excluding constituents with insufficient observations, 93 constituents with a total net notional of USD 154.34 billion remain to be included in the calculations. The unstressed delta-normal 1-day VaR at the 99% confidence level is USD 339.32 million (base case), which is about twice as high as the VaR reported by JPMorgan (2013, pp. 124 ff.) . This number will be used as a benchmark for scenarios with As laid out in Section 2.3.1, a plausibility constraint can be applied to the stress testing method. For this application, where correlation parameters are assumed to follow a multivariate normal distribution, this means considering only correlation scenarios that lie on or below a quantile ellipsoid, which is determined via the corresponding Mahalanobis distance. Out of the set of feasible scenarios, the one with the highest value at risk for a given quantile is reported in Table 2 .
For the 99%-quantile constraint the VaR is USD 381.08 million, which corresponds to a Table 1) , which "is a signature of the market impact of the CIO's trading". This structural break could not have been predicted by historical data, which shows the actual risk -owed to the size of the portfolio -was closer to the worst case scenario than suggested by the plausibility constraints. In the unconstrained (worst-)case, the parameter β 4 , capturing decorrelation between index series, appears as the major risk driver.
A correlation stress-test would have enabled JPMorgan's risk management to identify key risk drivers and more appropriately assess the risks of its portfolio. Figure 5 shows box-plots for the correlation parameters as well as the parameters as of 23 March 2012, and the worst case parameters at a Mahalanobis constraint equivalent to 99%. All parameters, with the exception of β 2 , which identifies whether an index is investment grade or high-yield, are stressed upwards, hence, decorrelate. The slight downward shift of β 2 can be attributed to a parameter increase prior to the stress test. 
Concluding Remarks and Outlook
The dependence structure of portfolio components is of great relevance to every financial portfolio, and as such, stress-testing correlation provides important information about portfolio risk.
The methodology developed in this paper maps risk-factors to correlations within a porfolio, which in turn allow to specify correlation stress-test scenarios in terms of risk-factor changes.
In addition, worst-case risk-factor scenarios can be identified, which gives insights into the main factors driving portfolio risks and potential losses. We derive analytical results that allow for computing the value-at-risk impact both for given scenarios and for determining worst-case scenarios.
To illustrate the method in a realistic setting, the correlation stress-testing methodology is applied to the case of the "London Whale". This serves as an interesting case, because -in an attempt to decrease the portfolio's riskiness -the notional amount was increased significantly by adding highly-correlated offsetting positions. Quite clearly, this kind of trading strategy is extremely vulnerable to correlation changes, and therefore lends itself to correlation stresstesting. Historical data suggests that, amongst the worst 1% of correlation scenarios, the 1-day 99%-VaR of the portfolio would have increased by 12% or more. Such a scenario is expected to occur 2-3 times a year. The overall worst-case correlation scenario for the portfolio entails a VaR increase of 83%. These are ceteris paribus results, isolating the effect of a correlation change and neglecting that in reality large correlation changes would typically occur jointly with volatility swings.
Correlation stress-tests are particularly insightful on large portfolios, as adverse correlation moves may be triggered from the market impact of large trades. More specifically, the ordinary co-movement of two or more assets might be disturbed by the market price impact of large trades. Hence, an appropriate risk assessment of large portfolios that might have a small conventional risk footprint, due to offsetting exposures, must account for correlation changes and correlation stress.
Another possible application are Central Counter-Parties (CCP), which clear exceptionally large financial portfolios. For example, 62% of the USD 544 trillion in notional outstanding for interest rate derivatives is cleared through CCPs (Wooldridge, 2016) . As part of their mandate and to protect themselves from the default of clearing clients, CCPs use a margining system that includes a mark-to-market settlement (variation margin) as well as a buffer to cover market losses after a clearing client defaults (initial margin). The latter is often calculated on a portfolio basis, in order to account for diversification benefits and to reduce clearing costs for clients. Therefore, portfolio margining is correlation-sensitive and correlation stress testing might uncover risks that are relevant on a systemic level. This is also relevant for client side collateral management having to post additional collateral (margin call) whenever required by an updated risk assessment of the CCP. Thus, correlation stress-testing on the clearing client side would provide insights on possible future margin requirements and the resulting collateral funding risk.
A Credit default swap valuation
Given an underlying entity (e.g. a sovereign or a company), a credit default swap (CDS) is a contract between two counterparties, the protection buyer and the protection seller, that insures the protection buyer against the loss incurred by default of the underlying entity within a fixed time interval. The protection buyer regularly pays a constant premium, the credit spread or CDS spread, which is fixed at inception, up until maturity of the CDS or the default event, whichever occurs first. This stream of payments is termed the premium leg of the CDS. In return, the protection seller agrees to compensate the protection buyer for the loss incurred by default of the underlying entity at the time of default in case this occurs before maturity. This constitutes the protection leg of the CDS. The CDS spread that makes the value of the premium leg and the protection leg equal is the fair CDS spread .
More precisely, let r > 0 denote the default-free interest rate, assumed to be constant for simplicity. Furthermore, assume that the payment at default is a fraction (1 − R) of the notational amount, R ∈ [0, 1). The probability of default of the underlying entity at time t until time T is denoted by P (t, T ); this probability is conditional on any information available until time t. Denote by s(t, T ) the fair credit spread at time t of a CDS with maturity T .
Here, we follow the convention that entering into a CDS involves no initial cash-flow, that is, the market value of a CDS at inception is 0. Even though CDS are nowadays traded with an upfront payment, this still corresponds to the common quoting convention. In other words, the discounted fair values of the premium and the default legs are equal. In addition, to simplify the exposition and notation, we assume that credit spreads are paid continuously instead of quarterly. From the point of view of a protection seller, the value of a CDS contract entered at time t is given via risk-neutral pricing by the value of the premium leg minus the value of the protection leg. Combining this with the fact that the initial value of the CDS is 0 gives: 0 = s(t, T )
T t e −r(u−t) (1 − P (t, u)) du =RPV01
−(1 − R)
T t e −r(u−t) P (t, du), or, re-arranging for the spread, s(t, T ) 1 − R = T t e −r(u−t) dP (t, u)
T t e −r(u−t) (1 − P (t, u)) du .
The term RPV01 denotes the risky present value of a basis point. For a full derivation we refer to e.g. Chapter 6 of O'Kane (2008).
The mark-to-market value of an existing CDS position is expressed as the cost of unwinding the transaction by entering into an offsetting CDS position. In the following we assume a CDS contract with maturity T and notional $1 entered at time 0 ≤ t from the point of view of the protection seller. Conditional on no-default at time t, the value of the position at time t is V t = s(0, T )
T t e −r(u−t) (1 − P (t, u)) du − (1 − R)
T t e −r(u−t) P (t, du)
= (s(0, T ) − s(t, T ))
T t e −r(u−t) (1 − P (t, u)) du = (s(0, T ) − s(t, T )) RPV01(t, T ).
Here we have used that the values of the premium and protection legs of the time-t CDS are equal.
A simplification of the valuation occurs by assuming that, similar to a constant interest rate, the default probabilities are subject to a constant hazard rate λ t > 0, i.e., P (t, T ) = 1−e −λt(T −t) , T ≥ t. The credit spread formula (9) reduces to the so-called credit spread triangle,
and the RPV01 is then expressed as
RPV01(t, T ) =
T t e −(r+λt)(u−t) du = T t e −(r+s(t,T )/(1−R))(u−t) du.
For value-at-risk calculations, it is useful to approximate the P&L ∆V by a first-order Taylorapproximation on the spread change ∆s = s(t, T ) − s(t − 1, T ): 6 ∆V = V t − V t−1 ≈ ∂ ∂s V t−1 · ∆s = −RPV01(t − 1, T ) · ∆s + (s(0, T ) − s(t − 1, T )) · ∂ ∂s RPV01(t − 1, T ) · ∆s.
The second term involves a product of spread changes and is therefore smaller, so we shall 6 Assuming that ∆t is small, we ignore the change due to time-decay.
ignore it for ease of computations, giving ∆V ≈ −RPV01(t − 1, T ) · ∆s.
B Tranche spread calculation
This appendix gives a brief outline of the calculation of fair spreads of credit index tranches required for estimating the β-parameters of the "London Whale" portfolio. The calculations are based on O' Kane (2008) . For tranches, the given market data consists of running spreads, upfront payments and base correlations. To make all calculations involving both index and tranche positions consistently use spread time series, the tranche data are transformed into financially equivalent fair spreads without upfront payment.
The present value of an index tranche with attachment point K 1 , detachment point K 2 and maturity T is given by (cf. O'Kane, 2008, Equation (20.1)):
where U (K 1 , K 2 ) is the upfront spread that is paid at inception of th trade, S(K 1 , K 2 ) is the running spread that is paid regularly (continuously in the case considered), Z(t) = e −rt is the time-t discount factor and where Q(t, K 1 , K 2 ) denotes the tranche survival probability. The expression T 0 Z(t)Q(t, K 1 , K 2 ) dt denotes the risky present value of a basis point (RPV01) and T 0 Z(t)(−dQ(t, K 1 , K 2 )) corresponds to the value of the protection leg that pays in case of default. The financially equivalent spread without an upfront payment satisfies s = U (K 1 , K 2 )/RPV01 + S(K 1 , K 2 ), so the calculation reduces to calculating the tranche survival curve Q(t, K 1 , K 2 ), t ∈ [0, T ].
Assuming m contiguous tranches, the survival probabilities Q(T, 0, K 1 ), Q(T, K 1 , K 2 ), . . . , Q(T, K m−1 , K m ) can be calculated iteratively from the expected tranche losses for each tranche (cf. O'Kane, 2008, pp. 378 ), which in turn are calculated from the base correlations and the index survival probability in a one-factor Gaussian latent variable model (cf. O'Kane, 2008, pp.
305-307).
Finally, the survival probabilities need to be calculated for t ∈ [0, T ]. Market convention holds that the quoted index spread corresponds to a flat term structure (O'Kane, 2008, p. 190) . Making the same assumption for the tranche spread s, the hazard rate λ entering tranche survival probabilities Q T = e −λT is determined via the so-called credit triangle λ = s/(1 − R), giving tranche survival probabilities Q t = e −λt . The RPV01 is then calculated as 
